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CRITIQUE AND COMMENT 
OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES 
by Carson K .  Eoyang and William James Haga 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
Although the application of general systems theory to the study of organizations may be 
promising, there are dangers of compromising the integrity of each. Several deficiencies in 
the attempt by Toronto (1975) are reviewed. In addition certain generalizations regarding GST 
and organizations are discussed briefly. 
cY.3 
N THEIR handbook of research design, I Campbell and Stanley (1966) summa- 
rized the potentials and pitfalls of approxi- 
mating experimental designs in field stud- 
ies. They stressed the imperative of control 
groups if field data are to be defended 
against rival hypotheses of causality. As a 
point of contrast, the work of Toronto 
(1975) illustrates many of the methodologi- 
cal errors they aimed to prevent. The lat- 
ter is characterized by (a) descriptions of 
peculiar data, (b) methodological errors, 
and (c) questionable generalizations. 
PECULIAR DATA 
Toronto (1975, p. 150) stated that his 
data were gathered from two parts of a 
sample organization that “were not homo- 
geneous in size or organizational structure 
and had widely differing functions.” In- 
deed, the only trait they shared was that 
both had second-line supervisors. These 
noncomparable data bases prevented To- 
ronto from reaching clear conclusions in 
his analysis. 
Among Toronto’s (1975, p. 152) conclu- 
sions was a statement that “the downward 
trend at the end of the program [system] 
indicates that a gradual improvement can- 
not sustain itself without supporting 
changes in the suprasystem.” Intuitively, 
this made sense. However, nothing in the 
results supported it. There were no assur- 
ances that changes in the suprasystem did 
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not, in fact, take place. It was not shown 
that a change in the suprasystem led to 
permanent change in the focal system. An 
alternative explanation, and one at least 
as credible as that advanced by Toronto, is 
that the subjects made “Hawthorne” re- 
sponses to the change agent interventions. 
When those attentions were withdrawn, 
the subjects’ performance dropped. With- 
out a control group in Toronto’s design, 
this rival hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Displaying standardized scores on 
charts (Toronto, 1975, p. 1531, necessarily 
involves means set to zero and time line 
data points expressed in standard devia- 
tions. Each standardized data point on the 
presented time line, therefore, must itself 
have been a mean with a variance of raw 
data points around it. When Toronto com- 
pared two time lines on a single chart, 
their relative divergence could not be 
judged without knowing their respective 
variances at each time point. No such in- 
formation was provided. Indeed, no find- 
ings were presented in tabular form. To- 
ronto denied the relevancy of significance 
testing (p. 148), the technique required to 
make a sensible analysis of his findings. 
One of Toronto’s central conclusions was 
that team-building interventions were re- 
lated to reductions in minor maintenance 
costs. Yet, the data showed (p. 155), and he 
stated (p. 154), that the observed cost im- 
provements were in a downward trend 
well before the interventions. In the face of 
this, he asserted (p. 154) that “it is clear 
that the improved team orientation evi- 
dent between the two 1970 surveys caused 
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or at least sustained the continuing im- 
provement in the cost index.” On the con- 
trary, it is just as appropriate to say that 
the interventions did not detract from cost 
reducing behaviors that were fostered by 
causes not captured in Toronto’s data. 
METHODOLOGICAL ERRORS 
“Managers cannot tolerate meddlesome 
research controls” (Toronto, 1975, p. 149). 
Not necessarily so. Quasi-experimental 
designs in field studies avoid a great deal 
of interference in the work of research sub- 
jects (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). The 
irony of this position is that Toronto pro- 
fessed to be, foremost, an organization 
change agent. Organization change agents 
are sorely dependent upon managerial tol- 
erance of interference (Morse & Reimer, 
1956; Bowers & Seashore, 1966). 
Toronto’s (1975, p. 149) design consisted 
of “different interventions or treatments 
applied to different systems and a common 
parameter is used as the independent vari- 
able. The major limitation of this method 
. . . is that trends and variations must be 
inspected visually in order to draw conclu- 
sions, thereby introducing judgmental er- 
ror . . .” No, the major limitation was ac- 
tually the application of different treat- 
ments to different groups, thereby remov- 
ing the possibility of attributing changes 
in post-test scores to any treatment or any 
group. Toronto dismissed the statistical 
significance tests which would have over- 
come the difficulties of “eyeballing” for 
meaningful differences in columns of num- 
bers or among lines on a chart. 
GENERALIZATIONS 
Toronto (1975, p. 148) offered the insight 
that “Permanent change in system activ- 
ity data requires a change in and the sub- 
sequent equilibration of both the system 
and its suprasystem.” Depending on how 
Toronto defined permanent change, this 
assertion is either a tautology or it is not 
necessarily true. In the latter event, gen- 
eral systems theory suggests that equilib- 
rium and homoestasis are not the only 
system states or processes that obtain 
(Buckley, 1968). 
Toronto (1975, p. 146) further asserted, 
without empirical support, that the major 
authority figure in a system is the “critical 
locus of any organizational change pro- 
gram.” However, there are numerous ex- 
amples in the literature which illustrate 
organizational change at a variety of lev- 
els (Morse & Reimer, 1956; Tsouderos, 
1955; Bennis, Benne, & Chin, 1969; Dal- 
ton, Lawrence, & Greiner, 1970; Leavitt, 
1965). For example, evidence gathered by 
Chapple and Sayles (1961) showed that 
genuine change in structural forms origi- 
nates in the technology of the workflow at 
the lowest operational level, the opposite 
locus of that embraced by Toronto. 
He also implied that an authority fig- 
ure’s succession changes a structure, i.e., 
substituting personalities within a chief 
executive slot would lead to structural 
change. Indeed, some change may occur. 
However, formal bureaucratic organiza- 
tions were devised precisely to minimize 
the impact of changes in personalities 
upon an organization’s structure (Weber, 
1947). 
Finally, Toronto (1975, p. 146) stated 
that “. . . crucial aspects of social systems 
cannot be discovered by taking them 
apart. Organizational change, therefore, 
cannot be studied in isolation by extract- 
ing a small portion from the whole but it 
must be studied in toto” This is an episte- 
mological limb upon which few students of 
rigorous organization research would be 
found. It ignores the insights into organi- 
zation functions that are only possible by 
breaking the whole down into manageable 
elements (Simon, 1957; Haberstroh, 1965). 
Rather, one can question whether organi- 
zations can ever by studied in toto. The 
universe of system variables in working 
organizations is unmanageably large. Any 
effective study necessarily selects but a 
subset of variables (Mechanic, 1963). The 
wonder of these prefatory remarks on so- 
cial science methodology is that the study 
Toronto reported was, itself, limited to a 
typically few variables. 
CONCLUSION 
A recurring theme was that organiza- 
tional change is so complex that only a 
general systems perspective could unravel 
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it. While such a view may have merit, 
Toronto’s application has demonstrated 
neither the utility of general systems the- 
ory nor the complexity of organizational 
change. In reality, neither the variables 
nor their relationships were notably com- 
plex. On the contrary, they were conven- 
tional and straightforward in everything 
but their presentation. Complexity was an 
element of which much was said but little 
was shown. The organization literature 
abounds with work by many researchers 
that is far more complex in design (Dan- 
sereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975). 
If general systems theory implies adher- 
ence to the logical-deductive traditions of 
science, Toronto’s report obscured the logic 
and the deductive process by which his 
hypotheses were generated. If this work is 
indicative of the benefits of marrying gen- 
eral systems theory with organization the- 
ory, we submit that the union will scarcely 
survive the honeymoon. In this instance 
the integrity of each has been compro- 
mised. 
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